

**REMARKS**

Reconsideration and withdrawal of the rejections of the application are respectfully requested in view of the remarks herewith, which place the application in condition for allowance or in better condition for appeal.

**I. STATUS OF CLAIMS AND FORMAL MATTERS**

Claims 1-3 and 6-8 are pending. Claim 1 is amended, without prejudice. No new matter is added.

It is submitted that these claims are patentably distinct from the prior art, and that these claims are in full compliance with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. §112. The remarks made herein are not made for the purpose of patentability within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 or 112; but rather the remarks are made simply for clarification and to round out the scope of protection to which Applicants are entitled. Support in the amended recitation in claim 1 is found in the specification on page 11, lines 6-8.

**II. 35 U.S.C. §103 REJECTION**

Claims 1-3 and 7 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as allegedly being unpatentable over U.S. Patent No. 5,411,792 to Yukinobu et al. in view of Applicants' own disclosure; claim 6 was rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as allegedly being unpatentable over Yukinobu in view of Applicants' own disclosure and further in view of U.S. Patent No. 5,155,005 to Sato et al.; and claim 8 was rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as allegedly being unpatentable over U.S. Patent No. 5,411,792 to Yukinobu et al. in view of Applicants' own disclosure and further in view of U.S. Patent No. 5,747,152 to Oka. The rejections will be collectively addressed and are respectfully traversed. Applicants respectfully reiterate that none of the references, either alone

or in combination, teaches, suggests or motivates a skilled artisan to practice the instantly claimed invention.

It is respectfully asserted that it is well-settled that there must be some prior art teaching which would have provided the necessary incentive or motivation for modifying the reference teachings. *In re Laskowski*, 12 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1397, 1399 (Fed. Cir. 1989); *In re Obukowitz*, 27 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1063 (BOPAI 1993). Further, “obvious to try” is not the standard under 35 U.S.C. §103. *In re Fine*, 5 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1596, 1599 (Fed. Cir. 1988). And, as stated by the Court in *In re Fritch*, 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1780, 1783-1784 (Fed. Cir. 1992): “The mere fact that the prior art may be modified in the manner suggested by the Examiner does not make the modification obvious unless the prior art suggests the desirability of the modification.” Also, the Examiner is respectfully reminded that for the Section 103 rejection to be proper, **both the suggestion of the claimed invention and the expectation of success must be founded in the prior art, and not Applicants' disclosure.** *In re Dow*, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1529, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

Against this background, the obviousness rejection fails. The instant invention is directed to a method for transferring a transparent conductive film onto one surface of a sheet base material made of a plastic material, wherein the transparent conductive film is made of a metal oxide having a specific resistance of  $3.0 \times 10^{-4}$  ohm-cm or less formed by sputtering, ion plating or electron beam deposition methods at a substrate temperature of 150°C or more. The instant invention does not need heating after forming a transparent conductive film

Yukinobu, either alone or in combination, does not teach or suggest such an invention. More specifically, Yukinobu fails to teach or suggest the transparent conductive film being made of a metal oxide having a specific resistance of  $3.0 \times 10^{-4}$  ohm-cm or less formed by sputtering, ion plating or electron beam deposition methods at a substrate temperature of 150°C or more.

Instead, Yukinobu's film, having ultra-fine ITO particles and a resin binder, requires a heating or calcinating step after forming or applying a coating. The instant invention, by contrast, does not. Thus, Yukinobu teaches away from the instant invention.

Applicants respectfully assert that the Examiner's reliance on any alleged disclosure by Applicants is misplaced. The portions of the specification relied upon by the Examiner—as basis for the allegation that ITO would inherently perform as the Examiner believes—does not contain information from which an obviousness rejection can be extrapolated. The Examiner's reliance on inherency is defective. The Examiner is again respectfully reminded that it is not enough to merely allege that simply because ITO may be the preferred material for the claimed conductive layer that it must “inherently” speak to the invention. Instead, there must be a disclosure or suggestion that the properties of the claimed invention are necessarily present in the art for inherency to attach. According to *In re Rijckaert*, 9 F.3d 1531, 1957 (Fed. Cir. 1993), “such a retrospective view of inherency is not a substitute for some teaching or suggestion supporting an obviousness rejection.” The Federal Circuit is clear that “ ‘inherency...may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient [to establish inherency].’ ” *Continental Can Company v. Monsanto Company*, 948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991), *citing to In re Oelrich*, 666 F.2d 578, 581-582 (C.C.P.A. 1981). Indeed, “before a reference can be found to disclose a feature by virtue of its inherency, one of ordinary skill in the art viewing the reference must understand that the unmentioned feature at issue is *necessarily* present in the reference.” *SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, Inc. v. International Rectifier Corporation*, 31 F.3d 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original).

Further, it is clear that the Examiner is improperly relying on Applicants' own disclosure for support of the obviousness rejection. As noted above, the Federal Circuit in *In re Dow* was very clear that both the suggestion of the claimed invention and the expectation of success must be founded in the prior art, and not in Applicants' own disclosure.

None of the secondary documents remedy these inherent deficiencies. Sato relates to a method of producing a polychromatic colored image with clear fine patterns. Oka relates to a transparent film comprising a transparent plastic substrate film and a hard coat layer. Neither document, however, provides the requisite teaching or suggestion that would lead a skilled artisan to practice the instantly claimed method for transferring a transparent conductive film onto one surface of a sheet base material made of a plastic material, wherein the transparent conductive film is made of a metal oxide having a specific resistance of  $3.0 \times 10^{-4}$  ohm-cm or less formed by sputtering, ion plating or electron beam deposition methods at a substrate temperature of 150°C or more.

It is also well-settled that "obvious to try" is not the standard upon which an obviousness rejection should be based. *See In re Fine*. And as "obvious to try" would be the only standard that would lend the Section 103 rejections any viability, the rejection must fail as a matter of law.

Consequently, withdrawal of the Section 103(a) rejection is believed to be in order and such action is respectfully requested.


**CONCLUSION**

By this Response, the application is in condition for allowance or in better condition for appeal. Favorable reconsideration of the application, withdrawal of the rejections and prompt issuance of a Notice of Allowance are, therefore, all earnestly solicited.

Respectfully submitted,

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